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Arbitration with the Soviets:
The Importance of Forum Selection
in Dispute Resolution Clauses in
Non-Maritime Joint Enterprise Agreements
Katherine T. Wardt
The reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev have caused dramatic
changes in the Soviet Union. In an effort to strengthen the Soviet
economy, Gorbachev has begun to remove many of the ideological
and practical restrictions that have traditionally hindered Ameri-
can business involvement in the Soviet Union.
These trends increase the appeal of the Soviet Union as a tar-
get for new U.S. business ventures. Glasnost, with its emphasis on
opening Soviet society, permits freer negotiations between poten-
tial Soviet and U.S. business partners. Perestroika has encouraged
the implementation of free market measures, programs and poli-
cies in selected sectors of the economy.
In light of these changes, it is not surprising that U.S. busi-
nesses have shown increased interest in entering Soviet markets.
However, because of the USSR's centrally-planned economy and
government-imposed restrictions on commercial relations, a U.S.
business may not simply lease land and set up shop on its own.
Instead, it must enter into a joint enterprise with a Soviet partner.1
In establishing and running these joint enterprises, the partners
must act in accordance with a collection of complex laws and de-
crees. In an effort to encourage foreign investment, the Soviets
have been changing the law with notable frequency. In addition,
t B.A. 1987, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Chicago.
This Comment will use the term "joint enterprise" ("JE"), rather than "joint ven-
ture," which is more common to the West.
It should be noted that the Soviets are currently in the process of radically reforming
their laws governing ownership and property. In March 1990, the central government pub-
lished a new ownership law that increases the ability of foreigners to own land and other
forms of tangible and intangible property. In addition, President Gorbachev has called for a
public referendum concerning ownership. Depending on the result of this referendum, for-
eigners may benefit from further expanded ownership rights. Even under the March 1990
ownership law, however, foreigners still may only own property in conjunction with a joint
enterprise. Razdel 5, statii 27-30, Zakona SSSR "0 Jobstvennocti v SSSR," Supreme Soviet
of the USSR, Mar 1990.
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they have been concluding private, unpublicized agreements with
individual businesses-agreements that subsequently affect the
regulation of JEs in general. As a result, U.S. businesses may find
it difficult to determine what law will govern a JE agreement at the
time of its creation. Even if it is possible to do so, it may still be
difficult to ensure that the same law will be in force later when
actual disputes arise.
Due to the general uncertainty of the law and the political sit-
uation in the USSR, inclusion of a well-considered dispute resolu-
tion provision could prove invaluable for the long-term success of a
JE. In the Soviet system, matters involving foreign parties are ar-
bitrated far more frequently than they are adjudicated, and parties
have a great deal of autonomy to determine, by contractual provi-
sion, the forum and governing law for disputes arising under that
agreement.
However, the process of negotiating a JE agreement in the
USSR is difficult and time-consuming for U.S. businesses accus-
tomed to contract negotiations in a free-market setting. As a re-
sult, parties may devote comparatively little time and effort to ne-
gotiating a dispute resolution clause. Rather than conducting
lengthy negotiations, parties to U.S.-USSR JE agreements often
use a boilerplate clause that calls for arbitration in Sweden using
the rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").'
This Comment argues that while the Swedish forum may
prove adequate for most disputes, considering the amount of time,
effort and money involved, U.S. businesses would be well advised
to consider the full range of dispute resolution forums available. In
addition to the "Swedish option," these possibilities include Soviet
courts and arbitral bodies, and dispute resolution before the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") in Paris. The procedural
consequences of each forum are significant and should be consid-
ered when drafting dispute resolution clauses in joint enterprise
agreements.
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of Soviet law affect-
ing joint enterprises. Part II discusses dispute resolution mecha-
nisms within the Soviet Union, including Soviet courts and arbitral
bodies. Part III discusses dispute resolution in Sweden, and part
IV considers the options provided by the ICC.
' The Commission drafted a set of arbitration rules that was subsequently adopted by
the General Assembly on December 15, 1976. These rules are discussed in greater detail in
part II.
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I. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR JOINT ENTERPRISES
IN THE SOVIET UNION
In order to craft a dispute resolution clause properly, a negoti-
ator must first understand the nature and substance of the Soviet
law governing the operation of joint enterprises in the Soviet
Union. A brief overview will demonstrate the complexity of Soviet
law and the ways it differs from U.S. law. These differences,
though important, are not always apparent because translations of
Soviet legal terms often use words familiar from U.S. law. Even the
notion of what constitutes a law varies greatly between the two
societies.
A. The 1987 Joint Enterprise Law
Joint enterprises in the Soviet Union are primarily governed
by four enactments that comprise the 1987 Joint Enterprise Law.'
In the United States we tend to think of law as a statute-that is,
a single enactment agreed upon by several government organs.
That is not, however, an accurate description of Soviet law. The
Joint Enterprise Law actually encompasses three documents cre-
ated by three different government entities4 over the course of sev-
eral months, and a substantial set of amendments passed little
more than a year later. Each of these documents has a different
focus. On January 13, 1987, the USSR Council of Ministers con-
cluded the first of these promulgations, the Decree on the Estab-
lishment of Joint Enterprises ("January Decree"). The January
Walter Sterling Surrey and Vladmir Lechtman, New Soviet Joint Venture Law: A
Political Curiosity or a Real Investment Opportunity?, in Janice R. Moss, ed, Private In-
vestors Abroad-Problems and Solutions in International Business 1988 § 6.01 at 6-2
(Matthew Bender, 1989). In addition, various ministries and other government organs have
created at least nine sets of regulations implementing the basic law. As of 1988, the Soviets
had not made these generally available. Id at § 6.01, 6-3 n 5. The point is two-fold: first,
there are many "agencies" involved, and many of them are making regulations of which U.S.
businesses may need to be aware; second, regulations are not automatically available for
perusal as soon as they come into existence.
While reform may be imminent, at the present time "government" and "politics" are
inseparable concepts in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the term "government" will here refer
to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") as well as the government of the
USSR.
Decree: On the Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and Operations of Joint
Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and Firms from Capitalist and De-
veloping Countries, USSR Council of Ministers (Jan 13, 1987), translated and reprinted as
Appendix B in Christopher Osakwe, The Death of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Investments
Policy: A Clinical Examination of the Soviet Joint Venture Law of 1987, 22 Vand J Trans-
natl L 1, 111 (1989). The Russian text is published as Sobranie Postanovlenii Pravitelstvo
SSSR, No 9, Item 40 (USSR 1987). -
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Decree was accompanied by the Decree of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet On Questions Related to the Creation of
Joint Enterprises,6 which focuses on taxation of JEs and dispute
resolution in Soviet and international tribunals. Finally, on Sep-
tember 17, 1987, the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") and the USSR Council of Ministers
issued the Joint Resolution on Additional Measures to Improve the
Management of Foreign Economic Relations," intended to increase
the efficiency of the Soviet bureaucracy in international trade.
Subsequently, the USSR Council of Ministers amended this initial
collection of decrees, edicts and resolutions through their Decem-
ber 9, 1988, Resolution on Additional Development of Foreign Eco-
nomic Activity ("December Resolution").8 The December Resolu-
tion accomplished several goals: it amended the January Decree
through the removal of restrictions on foreign ownership and con-
trol, created additional tax incentives, granted the JEs flexibility in
labor matters and announced the plan to make the ruble
convertible.9
Unfortunately, the Joint Enterprise Law does not address a
number of issues, and its relative newness creates uncertainty as to
how the law will be interpreted in practice. One commentator has
called it "a moving target" for both the Soviet and U.S. partners in
a JE.1° These uncertainties make a well-considered dispute resolu-
tion clause especially important.
B. Dispute Resolution under the Joint Enterprise Law
Dispute resolution under the Joint Enterprise Law is governed
primarily by Article 20 of the January Decree. Article 20 addresses
Decree: On Questions Concerning the Establishment in the Territory of the USSR
and Operation of Joint Ventures, International Amalgamations and Organizations with the
Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management Bodies, Presid-
ium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Jan 13, 1987), translated and reprinted as Appendix A in
Osakwe, 22 Vand J Transnatl L at 109. The Russian text is published as Vedomosti
Verkhovnova Sovieta SSSR, No 2, Item 35 (USSR 1987).
Joint Resolution on Additional Measures to Improve the Management of Foreign Ec-
onomic Relations, Communist Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") Central Committee and
the USSR Council of Ministers (Sept 13, 1987), 41 Economicheskaya Gazeta (Oct 1987),
cited in Moss, Private Investors Abroad at § 6.01, 6-2 n 3 (cited in note 3).
' Decree: On Further Development of Foreign Economic Activities of State, Coopera-
tive, and Other Public Enterprises, Associations and Organizations, USSR Council of Minis-
ters (Dec 2, 1988), translated and reprinted as Appendix C in Osakwe, 22 Vand J Transnatl
L at 120 (cited in note 5). The Russian text is published in Izvestia 2 (Dec 10, 1988).
9Osakwe, 22 Vand J Transnatl L at 122-25.
1" Tracey E. Aronson, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues and Ap-
proaches for the American Investor, 19 L & Policy in Intl Bus 851, 852-53 (1987).
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three types of disputes: (1) disputes between a JE and a Soviet
state-owned operation, co-operative" or "other 'public organiza-
tion[s]"; (2) disputes between different JEs; and (3) disputes be-
tween partners in the same joint ent'rprise when the disputes con-
cern "matters related to its activities."'1 Disputes covered by
Article 20 are to be governed by "legislation of the USSR. ' 12 This
provision suggests little flexibility for JE dispute resolution; in
fact,. however, the "legislation of the USSR" clause allows consid-
erable latitude for parties to select :the forum of their choice. 3
C. The Role of the Parties in Negotiating JE Agreements
*Despite the variety of options apparently available to U.S.-
USSR JEs, the Soviet system may impose significant restrictions
on the practical ability of contracting parties to make use of these
options. The structure of the Soviet political-economic system lim-
its the ability of the Soviet contracting party to make contract de-
cisions free from supervision by the ministries that control its exis-
tence.'As of January 1987, 21 ministries and departments and 70
enterprises and amalgamations (that is, groups of enterprises) had'
direct access to foreign markets at the level of specific commercial
operations. 4
The right of access to foreign markets does not automatically
carry with it the right to act as the Soviet contracting party to a
joint enterprise agreement. This theoretically confusing situation,
however, has somewhat simplified itself in practice. Many of the
existing JEs are between foreign entities and Soviet bodies known
as Foreign Trade Organizations ("FTOs"). FTOs are based in Mos-
cow and are part of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
("CCI").'5 Their central location and high profile in Soviet foreign
economic relations should theoretically make it easier to resolve
negotiation questions concerning who has the power to negotiate
the contract for the Soviets and what provisions will be acceptable
to the reviewing ministry.
" Decree on the Establishment of Joint Enterprises, art 20, in Osakwe, 22 Vand J
Transnatl L at 109, 114.
12 Id.
" See discussion in part I.D. regarding deference to contractual terms defined by the
parties.
1" Keith M. Dunn, The New Soviet Joint Venture Regulations, 12 NC J Intl L &
Comm Reg 171, 184 (1987).
Chun .Gu, The Applicable Law and Dispute Settlement in East-West Trade, 46 U
Toronto Fac L Rev 96, 108 (Winter 1988).
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Nevertheless, FTOs may have to submit proposed contracts to
their supervising ministry. Even if the FTO negotiating the con-
tract were willing to submit all disputes to an alternative arbitral
forum, such as the ICC, it is possible that the ministry controlling
that FTO would be able to pressure it into rejecting such a "lesser
known" (from the Soviet perspective) form of dispute resolution,
effectively limiting the parties' choices to either the Swedish Op-
tion or the Soviet Arbitration Court. Recent reforms have in-
creased the number of Soviet entities that have the authority to
conclude JE agreements. However, since the number of organiza-
tions with this authority is still somewhat limited, U.S. businesses
should be certain at the outset of JE negotiations that they know
exactly how much authority their Soviet counterparts possess.
D. The Importance of Soviet Contract Law Doctrine
Dispute resolution clauses will probably prove most useful to
joint enterprises in contract disputes (as opposed to tort or crimi-
nal actions). These contractual disputes are the easiest form of
conflict to anticipate. Moreover, other disputes, such as labor dis-
putes, are potentially subject to government intervention. It is im-
portant then, to keep in mind certain basic features of Soviet con-
tract doctrine.
The Soviet Union has a rather well-developed body of contract
law, with many superficial similarities to its U.S. counterpart. So-
viet law, however, must be analyzed in light of the environment in
which it functions. The similarities to U.S. contract law should nbt
automatically lead to the conclusion that each country's laws are
invoked for the same reasons. In particular, common terminology
may not have the same meaning in both systems. Additionally, it
may be harder to disprove fault in a breach of contract action
when the party attempting to do so is part of a planned economy
where "provision is made for materials to move along a chain en-
forced at every stage.""0 In such a system, only an entirely unfore-
seeable event would provide an excuse for non-performance."
Furthermore, contract negotiations with the Soviets often in-
volve hard bargaining. As a result, the Soviets assume that the par-
ties intend to have their contract govern their relationship to the
fullest reasonable extent. If it is possible to resolve a conflict using
" A.K.R. Kiralfy, A Comparison of Civil Procedure and State Arbitration Procedure
in the USSR, in Donald D. Barry, ed, Law and the Gorbachev Era 91, 98 (Martin Nijhoff,
1988) ("Kiralfy").
1" Id at 98.
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contractual provisions, the Soviets will use the contract as the gov-
erning law. The Soviets often refer to this as the "autonomous law
of the parties." This autonomous law, consisting of the terms of
the parties' written agreement, will govern the parties' relationship
and dispute settlement so long as it is not in contravention of So-
viet treaty obligations or legislation.
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION
Unlike the norm in the United States, arbitration, rather than
formal court proceedings, is the standard way of resolving commer-
cial disputes in the Soviet Union, particularly when foreign parties
are involved. Therefore, if a JE dispute is resolved within the So-
viet Union, it will probably be handled by arbitration, although
there are situations in which the Soviet courts have mandatory
jurisdiction.' 8
Although most JE-related disputes will not involve questions
raising mandatory jurisdiction (since they will involve disputes be-
tween the parties and will be governed by the terms of the con-
tract), familiarity with Soviet courts is important for JE negotia-
tors. The role of Soviet judges and arbitrators is'similar, and
procedural similarities between Soviet courts and arbitral bodies
also exist. In contrast to the U.S. system, in which arbitration is
theoretically less formal than adjudication, arbitration in the
USSR involves a large component of formality. As a result, Soviet
arbitrators act as non-partisan moderators or judges rather than
amicable go-betweens for the disputants; the more flexible atmo-
sphere of American arbitration may be absent in the Soviet
system.
A. Dispute Resolution in Soviet Courts
In certain circumstances, mandatory jurisdiction may force the
U.S. investor into the Soviet courts. In brief, there are two major
categories of possible mandatory jurisdiction. First, if parties do
not contract for any particular method of dispute resolution, the
Soviet courts have jurisdiction over the dispute by default. Second,
Soviet law may restrict the use of alternative methods of dispute
resolution in disputes involving "private"' 9 Soviet citizens, such as
" See part II.A.
" Here in quotation marks because a distinction between public and private citizens is
antithetical to the socialist ideal.
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labor disputes,20 or certain torts, such as products liability. While
litigation in the Soviet courts is not altogether to be avoided, it is
rather different from the U.S. litigation system. Therefore, U.S.
businesses will probably wish to avoid this unfamiliar system
whenever possible.
1. The Structure of the Soviet Legal System.
The Soviet court system has four levels. First, at the neighbor-
hood/factory level, Comrade's Courts afford local individuals an
"unofficial forum" for resolving their conflicts.2 1 Second, the Peo-
ple's Courts are the equivalent of American trial courts.22 Two
levels of appeal are also available-first in the District Courts and
then in the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.2"
The Soviet system differs from its U.S. counterpart in several
fundamental ways, although there have been signs that the Soviets
are interested in reforming their legal system so as to reduce those
differences.2 ' First, there are no juries in the Soviet system, even in
criminal trials.25 Second, Soviet judges take a more active role in
determining the course of litigation. Third, Soviet courts have no
appellate jurisdiction over the awards made by arbitral bodies.
On the other hand, Soviet civil trials are similar to those in
the U.S. (and different from Soviet arbitral proceedings) in that
they are normally conducted in public.2 Third parties may request
to be joined in civil proceedings when the eventual decision might
be prejudicial to their interests." There is, however, no mandatory
joinder.28  In notable contrast to the U.S. system, Soviet
procurators (government lawyers) have the right to initiate civil
proceedings on behalf of the interests of others, and have the right
to intervene at any stage in the proceedings. 29 Therefore, U.S.
20 Osakwe, 22 Vand J Transnatl L at 64, 65 (cited in note 5).
21 Gary Feinberg, Restructuring Justice in the Shadow of the Kremlin: A Journey
from Rhetoric to Reason, 72 Judicature 348, 356 (Apr-May 1989). These forums are unoffi-
cial in that they are run by co-workers or neighbors rather than by judges and advocats.
Nevertheless, these courts may impose sanctions such as fines and warnings.
21 Id at 355.
23 Id.
" Dick Thornburgh, Potomac Politics on Kapital Hill, NY Times A23 (Nov 7, 1989).
"' Feinberg, 72 Judicature at 355.
26 See the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic Code of Civil Procedure (1980)
("RSFSR CCP"), art 146, 2, cited in Kiralfy at 97 n 65 (cited in note 16). Selected articles
of the RSFSR CCP relating to foreign arbitration are translated and reprinted in Hans Smit
and Vratislav Pechota, 2A World Arbitration Reporter 2629 (Butterworth, 1988) ("WAR").
2 RSFSR CCP, art 38, cited in Kiralfy at 93 n 20.
28 RSFSR CCP, art 62, cited in Kiralfy at 98 n 76.
2" RSFSR CCP, art 41, cited in Kiralfy at 100 n 102.
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businesses faced with liabilities in the Soviet Union must remem-
ber that the possibility always exists that the Soviet government
will bring an action.
2. Procedural Aspects of the Soviet Court System.
The Soviet system is based on the civil law tradition of West-
ern Europe. However, it also has a "federalist" influence that
should be familiar to U.S. businesses. Much like the U.S. system of
state law, each republic has its own set of civil procedure codes,
although the independence of the republics is more limited than
that of U.S. states. Although each code may contain unique provi-
sions, the codes of the republics are based on their counterparts
from the Russian Soviet Federalist Socialist Republic ("RSFSR"),
and on the whole, the similarities between the various codes are
much greater than the differences. Moreover, all Foreign Trade Or-
ganizations ("FTOs") are based in Moscow and therefore are gov-
erned by the RSFSR legal codes. As a result, most JE disputes
handled by a Soviet court are likely to be governed by the RSFSR
Code of Civil Procedure ("RSFSR CCD").
The Soviet procedural structure affects the resolution of JE
disputes in Soviet courts in several important ways. First and fore-
most, the RSFSR CCD requires that most contracts (including JE
agreements) be in writing. 0 U.S. businesses should not assume
that oral agreements or modifications of agreements will be en-
forced. Second, as mentioned above, there are no juries in the So-
viet system. 31
Third, the judge plays an active role in creating the record
upon which the decision will be based. If a party fails to submit a
piece of available evidence that would support its case, the court
may either direct the party to provide more evidence or collect the
additional evidence on its own. 2 In addition, the process of deter-
mining the probative value of the evidence has few guidelines, and
those provided are general rather than specific. The judge must
determine the weight to be accorded to each piece of evidence
based on his "internal conviction" and his "socialist conscience. '33
This expansive view of the role of the bench extends beyond
the area of evidence. Courts can exceed the limits of the case as
30 RSFSR CCP, art 54, cited in Kiralfy at 98 n 80.
'1 Feinberg, 72 Judicature at 355 (cited in note 21).
8 RSFSR CCP, art 50(2), cited in Kiralfy at 99 n 87.
'3 RSFSR CCP, art 56, cited in Kiralfy at 98 n 87.
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delineated by the claims presented by the parties." A court can
also seize a defendant's property and money for the duration of the
proceedings so that the defendant cannot render the assets un-
available should the final award be in favor of the plaintiff." In
addition, courts are not required to terminate a case in the event
that the disputants agree on a settlement or the plaintiff abandons
his case."6 Even after the case has been decided, the court may on
its own initiative reopen and retry a case if "fresh" evidence that
was not originally available is discovered. 7
Finally, legal representation may present U.S. investors with
some undesirable choices. Non-Soviet lawyers cannot present a
case in a Soviet court unless they are members of the Soviet bar, or
are accompanied by a Soviet advocat18 In either case, the proceed-
ings will probably be conducted in Russian, thus increasing the in-
convenience for participants who do not speak Russian.
3. Role of the Soviet Courts in Arbitration.
The judicial and arbitral systems in the Soviet Union are to-
tally independent from each other. With the exception of the right
of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union to vacate Maritime Ar-
bitration Committee awards,39 arbitral awards are final and need
no judicial supervision to be enforceable. Once a dispute is before
the Arbitration Court ("AC"), 0 Soviet courts have no role to play
in the resolution process. AC awards are final and cannot be set
aside or modified by a court.4'
Even within Soviet court proceedings, there remains a strong
preference for resolving disputes through arbitration rather than
traditional trials. A judge must refuse any application for court
proceedings if the parties have agreed to arbitration.42 Even if a
judge accepts a case, he must explain to the parties and their rep-
resentatives their procedural rights and duties, including the op-
" RSFSR CCP, art 195, cited in Kiralfy at 96 n 54. In other words, the court is not
limited to the issues as they are defined by the parties.
3' RSFSR CCP, art 133-34, cited in Kiralfy at 96 n 49.
36 RSFSR CCP, art 219(4)(5), cited in Kiralfy at 96 n 55.
' RSFSR CCP, art 333, cited in Kiralfy at 103 n 124.
a' Osakwe, 22 Vand J Transnatl L at 66 n 247 (cited in note 5).
" Maritime Arbitration Committee Statute § 13 ("MAC Statute"), 2A WAR at 2638
(cited in note 26).
40 For a more detailed discussion of the arbitration court, see part II.B.1.
" 2A WAR at 2637-38.
42 RSFSR CCP, art 129(6), 2A WAR at 2629; Fundamental Principles of Civil Proce-
dure of the USSR and Union Republics (1977), art 31, cited in 2A WAR at 2628 ("Funda-
mental Principles").
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tions of arbitration and the Comrade's courts, and the conse-
quences of exercising either of those options." In a similar vein,
judges may transfer cases for settlement to arbitral tribunals so
long as the parties have agreed to the transfer." Agreement for
this purpose entails approval by the parties themselves as well as
their representatives. 5 Finally, if the parties reach an independent
agreement to transfer the case to an arbitral tribunal, the court
must honor that agreement. 6
B. • Soviet Arbitration
The various components of the Joint Enterprise Law require
the use of arbitration to resolve some disputes arising from JE ac-
tivities. While disputes may usually be brought before either the
Soviet courts or an arbitral tribunal if the parties have agreed to
do so, Soviet law stipulates that, in some cases, disputes must be
submitted to state arbitration tribunals.4
Arbitration in the Soviet Union is divided into two entirely
separate systems-one for domestic conflicts48 and the other for
conflicts involving foreign entities. The latter system contains two
major forums: the Maritime Arbitration Committee ("MAC")49
and the Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustry ("AC"). Although ad hoc arbitration is permitted, in prac-
43 RSFSR CCP, art 155, cited in 2A WAR at 2629.
4 RSFSR CCP, art 27, cited in 2A WAR at 2629.
41 RSFSR CCP, art 46, cited in 2A WAR at 2629.
40 RSFSR CCP, art 219, cited in 2A WAR at 2629; Fundamental Principles, art 41,
cited in 2A WAR at 2628.
'1 Decree on the Establishment of Joint Ventures, art 5, in Osakwe, 22 Vand J Trans-
natl L at 109 (cited in note 5).
' While domestic and foreign arbitration are handled by two entirely independent ar-
bitration systems, they are part of the same jurisprudential system. Therefore, the domestic
system may provide some useful insights into the perspective of the Soviet negotiators and
their perceptions of arbitration.
The domestic arbitration system has remained basically the same since 1931. It uses the
same rigorous evidentiary rules used by the Soviet courts. These evidentiary rules create a
sense of continuity with the court system. They also provide predictability as to how arbi-
tration will be conducted from a procedural standpoint. Contracts tend to be strictly
enforced.
On a practical level, U.S. negotiators should always be certain that negotiations are
being conducted using the framework, principles and procedures of the foreign system
rather than the domestic one.
For a fuller discussion of the Soviet domestic judicial and arbitral system, see the Intro-
duction to William E. Butler, ed, International Commercial Arbitration: Soviet Commercial
and Maritime Arbitration (Oceana, 1988) ("ICA Soy Arb Binder"); Introduction to 2A
WAR at 2625-27; and Kiralfy (cited in note 16).
41 The MAC exclusively handles maritime disputes.
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tice almost all international commercial disputes settled within the
USSR are decided by the MAC or the AC, with jurisdiction based
on international treaties."' These treaties have divided disputes in-
volving parties from member nations of the Committee for Mutual
Economic Assistance ("CMEA")51 from those involving parties
from the developing or non-Eastern Bloc industrialized nations.52
To the investor from a non-CMEA nation, this means that review-
ing the resolution of disputes involving JE partners from CMEA
nations may not provide an entirely reliable picture of how he or
she would have fared in the same situation.
The Arbitration Court ("AC") is a standing arbitration body
located in Moscow.53 No arbitral institutions in the other union re-
publics handle international commercial matters.54 Therefore, U.S.
businesses can be fairly certain that any arbitration in which they
are involved will take place in the AC. Known until recently as the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission ("FTAC"),55 the AC con-
sists of a central committee that creates ad hoc tribunal panels to
handle disputes as they arise. The AC resolves conflicts between
Soviet entities and ipvestors from CMEA member nations, as well
as conflicts between Soviets and business partners from developing
countries and non-socialist industrialized countries.
Established in 1932, the AC is controlled by the All-Union
Chamber of Commerce and Industry ("CCI").'6 The CCI is not
part of the state apparatus; however, it is still subject to "general
supervision by a state agency," namely, the USSR Ministry of For-
eign Economic Relations.6 Traditionally, Westerners have held
strong reservations about the possible hidden ties between the AC
and the various groups that oversee it, and also about the "alterna-
tive occupations of the Soviet arbitrators." 8 However, despite
these concerns, the AC has achieved an excellent reputation for
50 2A WAR at 2625-27.
" The Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance is the Eastern Bloc equivalent of
the European Economic Community.
5 2A WAR at 2626.
"' Statute on the Arbitration Court attached to the USSR Chamber of Commerce and
Industry § 1 (confirmed Dec 14, 1987), translation reprinted in ICA Soy Arb Binder, bklt 2
at 37-38 (cited in note 48).
" 2A WAR at 2627.
" The AC is attached to the Committee of Commerce and Industry. Since the AC
serves the same function as its predecessor, the FTAC, and use of the two acronyms might
be confusing, AC will here refer to both the AC and FTAC.
'6 ICA Soy Arb Binder, bklt 2 at 18.
57 Id.
" Id at 19.
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independence and impartiality and has gained increasing, recogni-
tion and acceptance in the international community. 9
1. The History of Arbitration Court Decisions Involving
American Parties.
The favorable reputation of the AC seems to be based largely
on the decisions it has rendered over the years, although the value
of relying on those awards as indicia of a favorable atmosphere for
resolution of disputes involving U.S. JE partners may be somewhat
questionable. The AC issued over three thousand awards between
1934 and 1987, 511 of which are readily available in English."
However, only about one hundred of the translated cases involved
non-CMEA parties between 1978 and 1981, and of those, many in-
volved developing countries."'
In light of U.S.-USSR relations since World War II, it is not
particularly surprising that the number of reported awards involv-
ing U.S. corporations was particularly small. Of the three U.S.-
USSR awards readily available in English for the period between
1934 and 1981, only one involved a truly American corporation, a
fur purchaser in New York."2 The other two involved Amtorg, the
Soviet trading organization incorporated in the United States.63
Therefore, little evidence is available to refute concerns some indi-
viduals may have that a Soviet dispute-resolution body is likely to
discriminate against U.S. businesses. However, the wealth of ex-
isting cases involving various Western European entities could be
reviewed for signs of anti-capitalist bias."
The three awards involving U.S. entities addressed export/im-
port trade disputes rather than joint economic projects within the
Soviet Union. Despite the varying natures of the trade relation-
ships, the awards indicate the existence of procedures that may be
beneficial to U.S. JE partners entering into arbitration before the
AC. Decisions tend to be made quickly. In the three translated
cases involving U.S. parties, the longest time span from the initial
' Id.
00 ICA Soy Arb Binder, bklt 2 at 17. Note that not all decisions are published.
01 Gu, 46 U Toronto Fac L Rev at 117 (cited in note 15).
02 U.S. Firm Kestenbaum Brothers v V/O Soyuzpushnina (1949), cited in ICA Soy Arb
Binder, bklt 3, award No 24.
" V/0 Raznoexport v American Joint-Stock Co. Amtorg (1941), cited in ICA Soy Arb
Binder, bklt 3, award No 20; V/O Soyuzpushnina v Amtorg (1942), cited in ICA Soy Arb
Binder, bklt 3, award No 22.
04 For an extensive collection of AC awards' translated into English, see ICA Soy Arb
Binder.
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filing of the claim to the final award was just over three months. 5
The types of relief sought and granted were familiar from U.S.
contract cases, as was much of the terminology and reasoning. In
reaching its decisions, the AC considered issues such as statutes of
limitation, contract modifications and imperfect delivery.
Perhaps the most notable trend in the awards and their ac-
companying explanations was the AC's focus on the terms of the
contract. Consistent with the commitment to the "autonomous law
of the parties,"6 6 whenever possible, the AC referred to the terms
of the contract and used them to resolve the dispute. 7 Since JE
agreements must be reviewed by the ministry in charge of oversee-
ing the Soviet partner to the agreement before they are signed, it
seems likely that most of the potential conflicts with Soviet law
will have been weeded out before the agreement enters into force.
If that is indeed the case, the parties can be relatively certain that
the structure and rules that they have created will be used to settle
any future disputes brought before the AC.
Some businesses may be concerned that the fate of a JE in the
Soviet Union is tied more to the general economic and political
situation in the USSR than to rules and regulations or contract
terms. While this may be true of efforts to establish new JEs, bar-
ring a second October Revolution (complete with the nationaliza-
tion of all property), the dispute resolution system seems to be in-
dependent enough to maintain its ability to make impartial
decisions, even in the face of adverse political conditions. For ex-
ample, the ability of the AC to hand down a decision partially in
favor of a U.S. party in 1949, seems indicative of independence
from the political powers of the country.6
2. Procedural Law of the Arbitration Court.
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry recently imple-
mented new legislation concerning the operation of the AC. A se-
ries of measures completed in late 1987 and early 1988 have re-
placed the body of law that had governed the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission since 1975. The Reglament of March 1988
("Reglament") now contains the great majority of the current reg-
' Kestenbaum Bros (cited in note 62).
" See part I.D.
'7 See, for example, Kestenbaum Bros.
8 Since the Kestenbaum decision is over forty years old, U.S. businesses would be well
advised to review more recent cases involving Western European entities with similar com-
mercial characteristics and investment strategies.
[1990:
USSR JOINT ENTERPRISES
ulations.6 9 Other than changing the name of the arbitral board to
the Arbitration Court, most of the governing regulations remain
unchanged from the earlier law. The changes that have been made
seem to reflect a desire to increase the predictability of arbitration
before the AC.
One new provision spells out more clearly the guidelines for
determining what law will be applied 0 Procedurally, AC arbitra-
tion is governed by Soviet legislation-most notably by the terms
of the Reglament, but also by "legislative provisions of Soviet law
appertaining to international commercial arbitration. ' 71 The arbi-
trators are given broad discretion to decide all other procedural
manners as they see fit and in accordance with equitable treatment
of the parties.72
The Reglament limits AC jurisdiction to contract disputes and
other civil law disputes concerning foreign trade, technology trans-
fers and other related disputes.73
Procedures for filing and responding to claims before the AC
are similar to the procedures for complaint and response used in
U.S. courts. 74 Both sides may present written evidence and use ex-
pert witnesses to support their arguments.7 During the hearing it-
self, both parties may present their case using any authorized rep-
resentative they appoint.7"
Although parties may be represented by foreign counsel, pro-
ceedings are primarily conducted in Russian. If a party wishes to
have a translation of any evidence, filed papers, or part of the pro-
ceedings, the translation will be done at the expense of the party
"' The Reglament is law just as the 1987 Joint Venture Law is law. However, the provi-
sions of the Reglament are all contained in one document with appendices. These are: (1)
Statute on the Arbitration Court Attached to the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try (confirmed Dec 14, 1987), reprinted in ICA Soy Arb Binder, bklt 2 at 37 (cited in note
48);'(2) Reglament of the Arbitration Court Attached to the USSR Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (confirmed Mar 11, 1988), reprinted in id at 39 ("Reglament"); and (3) Annex
to the Reglament of the Arbitration Court Attached to the USSR Chamber of Commerce
and Industry: Statute on Arbitration Fees and Expenses and on the Costs of Parties, trans-
lated and reprinted in id at 57 ("Annex to the Reglament").
70 Reglament § 13.
Id at § 13(2).
72 Id.
" Reglament § 1(1).
71 See, for example, Reglament §§ 14-18, 29.
7' Id at §§ 28, 30.
16 Statute on the Arbitration Court Attached to the USSR Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (1987), art 6, translation printed in ICA Soy Arb Binder, bklt 2 at 37 (cited in note
48).
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making the request.7 7 The existing provisions suggest that if a
party chooses to use a representative who does not speak Russian
well, a translator will be required for the proceedings. 8
The Reglament has also changed several procedural aspects of
arbitration before the AC. First, in the area of evidence, the new
legislation gives arbitrators greater discretion. On a general level,
arbitrators are charged with evaluating the evidence "according to
their internal conviction." ' More concretely, the Reglament con-
tains a new provision giving arbitrators the right to summon and
hear witnesses.8 0
Second, the Reglament encourages speedy resolution of dis-
putes. Previously, parties in all cases had two months to eliminate
defects in the Statement of Claim.8 ' Now, however, two months is
the upper limit, and it appears that in some cases the parties may
have less time to amend their errors.82 In addition, the parties
themselves may reduce the amount of time between notification
and the arbitration hearing to fewer than 30 days.8
The most significant changes from the prior law were made to
improve the confidential nature of AC proceedings. Closed-session
proceedings have become the rule rather than the exception under
the Reglament. In the past, proceedings were open, unless one of
the parties or the arbitrator requested that the session be closed. 4
The Reglament, however, provides only for closed sessions, al-
though non-participants may attend with the permission of the
parties.8 " Finally, publication of AC awards is now possible only
with the approval of the Chairman of the AC, and even then is
subject to fairly rigorous restrictions. In publishing an award, "the
interests of the parties shall be taken into account, and, in particu-
lar, information containing the surnames of the persons, the names
of the enterprises, goods and prices are not to be published. The
" Annex to the Reglament § 6(1) (cited in note 69).
78 Reglament § 9.
" Reglament § 30(4).
"' Reglament § 30(1).
s" Rules of Procedure for Cases in the Foreign Arbitration Commission Attached to the
USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry § 16(1) (repealed), translation reprinted in ICA
Soy Arb Binder, bklt 2 at 15. The Statement of Claim is similar to a plaintiff's complaint in
the U.S. system. The Rules were repealed in conjunction with the enactment of the new
legislation that included the Reglament.
82 Reglament §§ 17(1), 17(2).
Reglament § 22.
84 Rules of Procedure for Cases in the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, § 23,
translated and reprinted in ICA Soy Arb Binder, bklt 2 at 15, 24.
11 Reglament § 25.
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chairman . . . also may not permit the publication of other data
whose disclosure he considers to be inappropriate."8' On the one
hand, these provisions may be an improvement since they offer
parties more privacy. However, the new restrictions may make it
more difficult to monitor the performance of the AC and to use
existing awards to predict the outcome of future disputes.
The new legislation did not affect the procedures for setting
fees or enforcing awards. Fees are set using schedules in the Annex
to the Reglament 8 7 The rates were raised most recently in March
of 1988.88
Enforcement of AC awards rests on a two-tier system. Volun-
tary adherence is preferred, but if parties fail to execute the award
within' the designated time (or a reasonable time if no time has
been designated), recourse may be had to the courts to ensure en-
forcement. In addition, support is provided by the New York Con-
vention on the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards,89 to which both
the USSR and the U.S. are signatories.
3. Selection and Power of Arbitrators.
Under the Reglament, disputes brought before the AC are de-
cided by a sole arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators, depending
on the wishes of the parties.9 0 Regardless of the number of arbitra-
tors to be used, the basic qualifications are the same. Arbitrators
are expected to be impartial and independent. 1 They must be se-
lected from a list of individuals who have been pre-selected by the
Presidium of the CCI.92 Theoretically, the list could contain non-
Soviets. In practice, however, it does not.9 3
8 Reglament § 42.
'7 Annex to the Reglament §§ 2(3), 2(4) (cited in note 69).
88 Id. The fees were raised as follows:
Amount in Controversy Old Cost 1989 Cost
5,000R 150R 150R
10,000R 300R 400R
100,000R 2,100R 2,650R
200,000R 3,100R 4,150R
Annex to the Rules of Procedure for Cases in the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
Attached to the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry: Statute on Arbitration Fees
and Expenses and on the Costs of Parties § 2 (1975), translated and reprinted in ICA Soy
Arb Binder, 31, 34-35; Annex to the Reglament, § 2 (1988)..
11 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21
UST 3.2517 (1958).
90 Reglament § 5(3).
Reglament § 4(2).
9 Reglament § 4(1).
3 2A WAR at 2634 (cited in note 26).
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Recently, there has been some discussion of changing the sys-
tem so as to allow foreign arbitrators to sit on AC panels. Although
no changes have actually been made, two approaches have been
suggested: (1) adding foreigners to the AC lists, or (2) combining
the lists of the AC and other foreign national institutions."' Under
the current system, the Presidium selects arbitrators for four-year
terms.9 5 Arbitrators must have "the special knowledge" necessary
to resolve the types of disputes that may be brought before the
AC. 96
If the dispute is to be heard by a single arbitrator, the parties
have thirty days to select a mutually agreeable arbitrator.9 7 In the
event that the parties fail to do so, the president of the AC makes
the selection." If the case is to be heard by a three-person panel,
the claimant must select one arbitrator in the claim, or request
that the AC make an appointment on his behalf.9 The respondent
then has 30 days from receipt of the Statement of Claim to select a
second arbitrator (or request that the AC make a selection). 100 The
two arbitrators then select the presiding arbitrator. If the two arbi-
trators fail to make a selection within fourteen days, the AC will
appoint the presiding arbitrator.'0 ' In certain cases, parties may
appoint reserve arbitrators at the same time.0 2 Parties may chal-
lenge the impartiality of any of the arbitrators prior to the com-
mencement of the proceedings. However, once the proceedings
have begun, challenges will be permitted only at the discretion of
the unchallenged member(s) of the panel, or of the AC, when nec-
essary. , Arbitrators have the authority to decide questions of ju-
risdiction,'0 challenges to themselves, experts and translators, 0 5
and procedural issues.10 They may also make awards or terminate
the proceedings. 107 However, the AC retains the power to deter-
RSFSR CCP, art 155, cited in 2A WAR at 2629, 2634.
Reglament § 4(1).
" Id.
17 Reglament § 20.
" Id.
Reglament § 15(2)(e).
Reglament § 18(3).
101 Reglament § 19(2).
"' Reglament § 19(3).
103 Reglament § 23.
104 Reglament § 1(4).
100 Reglament § 23(l), (3).
"' Reglament §§ 21-31.
"9 Reglament §§ 34-35.
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mine the law to be applied." 8 Until a panel is formed, all proce-
dural matters are handled by the, AC.0 9
C. Assessment of Arbitration Mechanisms Within the
Soviet Union
Some commentators suggest that U.S. business partners will
find Soviet arbitration procedures more familiar than Soviet court
proceedings." 0 It is certainly true that the arbitration procedures
of the AC have been specifically designed to address disputes with
foreign trading partners. On the other hand, these procedures may
provide illusory benefits. In Soviet arbitration, as well as court pro-
ceedings, contracts tend to be strictly enforced. Therefore, even
though the Soviets may institute a number of procedural changes
for arbitration involving foreigners-changes that may make it ap-
pear that the Soviets are willing to accommodate the special needs
of foreign investors-it seems unlikely that the Soviets will ever be
very flexible. Given the Soviet emphasis on the parties' contract,
there is little room for arbitrators to act less as a judge and more
as a moderator.
There are corresponding advantages to Soviet arbitration that
may make up for the disadvantage of having a less conciliatory ar-
bitrator. Arbitration before the AC provides a solid set of proce-
dural guidelines and safeguards that may be preferable to those
provided by a non-Soviet forum, depending on where enforcement
will be necessary and the nature of the JE. These procedural rules
are relatively predictable and may be determined by reference to
only a few bodies of law. The parallels between Soviet court and
arbitral proceedings provide an important method for predicting
how these rules will be applied.
Use of the AC eliminates one of the major uncertainties asso-
ciated with any form of international arbitration. Normally, the
sovereignty of the host state for the arbitration may impose unex-
pected limitations on the ability of parties to determine the proce-
dural laws that will govern their subsequent disputes. Simply put,
the host state may bar the use of any procedure it considers anti-
thetical to the nation's public policies, sovereignty or judicial the-
ory. Arbitration before the AC eliminates that potential problem.
Since the AC is officially part of the Soviet apparatus, and its gov-
..8 Reglament § 13.
10, Reglament §§ 1-20.
11 Osakwe, 22 Vand J Transnatl L at 66 n 246 (cited in note 5).
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erning laws were created and passed by the Soviet government, it
should be less likely that the Soviet government will strike down
the use of one of the AC procedures on the grounds that the proce-
dure violates Soviet public policy or sovereignty.
Moreover, using the AC may offer greater predictability con-
cerning choice of law. In international arbitration, simply deter-
mining which procedural laws may apply and how they will inter-
act is often difficult and time-consuming. If there is little in the
way of "case law" to use as guidance, the task of reviewing all the
potentially applicable procedural codes may be overwhelming. But
unlike other arbitral bodies, the AC has developed a body of acces-
sible "case law" that potential parties may use to discern how the
AC might handle their disputes.111
At the same time, the AC's history of more than fifty years of
independent and apolitical decisionmaking indicates a system that,
despite its link to the government and political apparatus, can pro-
vide impartial decisionmaking. Therefore, in constructing forum
selection provisions of JE agreements, U.S. businesses should give
the Soviet arbitration system serious consideration.
II. ARBITRATION BEFORE THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
In addition to the dispute resolution mechanisms provided by
the Soviet government, U.S. business partners in joint enterprises
may, by contract, provide for dispute resolution in a third country.
Since the early 1970s, the governments of the U.S. and the USSR
have expressed a commitment to this kind of dispute resolution,
culminating in the 1977 agreement between the USSR All-Union
Chamber of Commerce and Industry ("CCI") and the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA").11
Under the provisions of the 1977 Arbitration Agreement, U.S.-
Soviet JEs may refer all their disputes to arbitration by the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce or any other arbitral body upon
which the parties agree.1 3 The 1977 Arbitration Agreement con-
tains a suggested "Optional Clause" that, when, included in a con-
... Admittedly, the case law may be of limited value as a tool for making predictions.
See part I.B.1. However, parties may take some comfort in the existence of an alternative
method of assessing the forum's behavior.
"' The agreement took the form of exchanged letters dated December 29, 1976. The
full set of these letters is reprinted as Appendix 5 in English in Arbitration in Sweden
(1984) 203 (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2d ed 1984).
... Id at 204-05.
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tract, binds parties to arbitration of disputes by the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce using UNCITRAL rules." 4
Provisions calling for arbitration of disputes in Sweden using
Swedish substantive law have become increasingly common in JE
agreements between U.S. and Soviet partners." ' Some scholars
have dismissed this option as doing little for the U.S. investor be-
yond affording a modicum of "psychological comfort" through the
knowledge that any arbitration will be conducted using the law of
a neutral third country.11 6 However, despite these criticisms, Swed-
ish arbitration remains a popular option.'1"
A. Obligations under the 1977 Arbitration Agreement
The 1977 Arbitration Agreement actually consists of letters
exchanged among the CCI, the AAA, and the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce ("SCC"). In these letters, the organizations agreed to
encourage the use of Swedish arbitration, and particularly the in-
clusion of the Optional Clause." 8 The Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce agreed to act as the host organization, as well as the
authority responsible for overseeing the appointment of the arbi-
trators, providing facilities and support services on request."
Under the Optional Clause, contracting parties agree to sub-
mit "[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim out of or relating to this
contract" to the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce for final, bind-
ing arbitration, to be conducted using the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules.120 Although the reason for this choice of procedural law has
never been spelled out, perhaps it may be explained by the fact
that the Soviets were involved in drawing up the UNCITRAL
114 Optional Arbitration Clause for Use in Contracts in USA-USSR Trade 1977, 1-2
("Optional Clause"), Enclosure 1 to AAA Letter to the USSR CCI (Dec 29, 1976), reprinted
in Arbitration in Sweden at 205.
"' Gu, 46 U Toronto Fac L Rev at 115 (cited in note 15).
,, Id at 119. Gu argues that the only reason the Soviets are willing to submit to a
Swedish choice of law provision is because the Soviets believe that Swedish substantive law
is not substantially different from their law. Gu implies that arbitration in Sweden is sub-
stantially the same as arbitration in the USSR.
"I Note that the option is only available to U.S. businesses (as opposed to other non-
Soviet investors). One scholar has suggested that this limitation may violate the Soviet Con-
stitution. Osakwe, 22 Vand J Transnatl L at 92-96 (cited in note 5). However, as Professor
Osakwe admits, it seems rather unlikely that any of the Soviet partners involved will force
adjudication of the issue. Id at 96.
Optional Clause.
"' Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, letter to the AAA (Dec 29, 1976), reprinted in
Appendix 5 to Arbitration in Sweden at 209-10 (cited in note 112). An identical letter was
also sent to the USSR CCI.
120 Optional Clause, 1.
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Rules. Therefore, it is possible that the Soviets feel more comforta-
ble with UNCITRAL than with other sets of arbitral rules.
The CCI and AAA agreed that the Optional Clause may be
used in contracts between "legal or natural persons of the U.S.A"
and Soviet FTOs.12' However, the Optional Clause is not the only
option under the 1977 Agreement. Parties are free to make use of
"the [Optional] Clause or other such form of arbitration clause
which they may mutually prefer and agree best suits their particu-
lar needs."' 22 In practice, parties have tended to use the Optional
Clause and the 1977 Arbitration Agreement in general as the basis
for dispute resolution clauses calling for arbitration in Sweden.'28
Parties can only use the "Swedish Option" for matters that
Swedish law permits the SCC to arbitrate. The controlling provi-
sion for the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce states, "[a]ny ques-
tion in the nature of a civil matter which may be comprised by
agreement... may, when a dispute has arisen, with regard thereto,
be referred by agreement between the parties to the decision of
one or more arbitrators."' 2 In other words, the organization can
handle civil matters with some exceptions and some extensions.
Including the Optional Clause in a contract has a number of
effects. First, it makes the arbitration binding and final. Second, it
designates the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce as the appointing
authority. Third, it requires that disputes be resolved by a three-
member panel and sets out the procedures for selecting the arbi-
trators. Fourth, it designates Stockholm as the venue for the pro-
ceedings. Fifth, it requires that parties make their best efforts to
choose a language in which to conduct the proceedings.12 5 If the
parties fail to agree on a language, the arbitrator will make the
decision.'26 In this situation, the statements of claim and defense
must be written in English and Russian, and all oral hearings will
be interpreted into English and Russian.127 However, all other doc-
uments will be translated only at the arbitrators' discretion. 28
"' Letter of the AAA to the USSR CCI (cited in note 114).
... Id at 203-04.
,2' Gu, 46 U Toronto Fac L Rev at 115 (cited in note 15).
... Swedish Arbitration Act of 1929, § 1 (Lag om skiljemlin, 1929 No 145), translated
and reprinted as Appendix I to Arbitration in Sweden at 172 (cited in note 112) ("Arbitra-
tion Act").
Optional Clause (cited in note 114).
126 Optional Clause 8.
,21 Optional Clause 8.1, 8.3.
121 Optional Clause 8.2.
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B. Choice of Procedural Law under the Optional Clause
The Optional Clause makes arbitration subject to the UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules unless an UNCITRAL provision conflicts
with a provision of the clause. In the event of a conflict, the clause
provision governs.1" However, parties should not assume that UN-
CITRAL will be the only procedural law that will apply. The pro-
cedural law governing U.S.-USSR JE disputes in Swedish arbitra-
tion will be a patchwork of provisions drawn from the Swedish
laws, 130 UNCITRAL rules and the terms of the contract itself. On
the one hand, the arbitrators will apply the laws in a hierarchical
manner. If there is a conflict between an UNCITRAL rule and a
contract term, the contract term will govern.13' If a conflict arises
between a mandatory Swedish law provision and an UNCITRAL
rule or a contract provision, the Swedish law will govern. 132 On the
other hand, these three bodies of law will supplement each other,
filling in gaps left by one another. The relationship is complex and
may vary rather significantly from one dispute to the next.
Both the UNCITRAL Rules and the Swedish Foreign Arbitra-
tion Act' limit the extent to which UNCITRAL procedural law
can determine the course of proceedings in Swedish arbitral fo-
rums. Under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, if there is a conflict be-
tween an UNCITRAL rule and a provision of the law applicable to
a given arbitral forum from which the parties cannot derogate,13
the latter provision prevails. 3 5 If the arbitration is conducted in
12 Optional Clause 1.
131 Six pieces of law govern the conduct of arbitration in Sweden: (1) the Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses of 1923 ("General Protocol"); (2) the Convention for the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 ("Geneva Convention"); (3) the Arbitration Act (cited in
note 124); (4) the Swedish Act of 1929 Concerning Foreign Arbitration Agreements and
Awards (Lag om utlinska skiljeavtal och skiljedomar, 1929 No 147) (as amended and in
force on Jan 1, 1984), translated and reprinted as Appendix 2 to Arbitration in Sweden at
181 (cited in note 112) ("Foreign Arbitration Act"); (5) the 1971 amendments to the Foreign
Arbitration Act; and (6) the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, ("New York Convention") (cited in note 89).
1 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 1.1, reprinted as Appendix 7 in Arbitration in
Sweden at 217.
sI Arbitration in Sweden at 53.
133 Foreign Arbitration Act.
134 It may prove difficult to predict from which laws governing the arbitration the par-
ties will be able to deviate. Article 1.2 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is intended to
act as a safeguard against infringement on the sovereignty and legal integrity of the contract
and the nation in which the arbitration proceedings are held. Accordingly, if an UNCITRAL
provision conflicts with a mandatory provision of the law applicable to the arbitration, the
arbitral body will disregard the UNCITRAL provision.
13' UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 1(2), reprinted in Arbitration in Sweden at 217.
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Sweden, the provisions of the Swedish arbitration acts govern; par-
ties generally cannot provide for arbitration in Sweden under for-
eign procedural rules that conflict with the mandatory provisions
of the Arbitration Act. 3" The relevant commentary by the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce has both extended and limited the
scope of this restriction. On the one hand, the SCC commentary on
the provision asserts that the Arbitration Act leaves "ample room"
for the use of foreign procedural rules.1 37 On the other hand, the
SCC also notes that it is often difficult to classify individual Swed-
ish statutory provisions as mandatory or voluntary. 18
Arbitrators in Sweden must adhere to the Arbitration Act as
well as to procedural regulations specified by the parties. While the
Arbitration Act contains only a few rules of procedure, the funda-
mental concepts behind the Swedish arbitration system should be
kept in mind, since arbitrators may not contravene Swedish public
policy.3 9 Arbitrators may also use the Swedish system to resolve
conflicts that arise concerning what procedural provision should be
applied in a given situation.
The Swedish procedural code builds on three basic principles.
First, all material considered in reaching a judgment must be
presented orally. Second, the oral presentation must be made di-
rectly to the court. Third, the main hearing should be conducted
without interruptions, in one session if possible, and if there is too
much material for one day, the hearing should be conducted on
consecutive days. 40 This last provision in particular should be
carefully noted by U.S. participants who may be more accustomed
to the often protracted process of litigation in U.S. courts.
The primary procedural rules, of course, are those in the Arbi-
tration Act. The procedural regulations of the Arbitration Act are
contained in sections 12 through 15 and section 19. Subject to limi-
tations found elsewhere in the Act, arbitrators must follow the
wishes of the parties." In so doing, SWeden emphasizes the use of
arbitration as a private dispute resolution mechanism, requiring
the arbitral tribunal to act in accordance with any agreement
reached by the parties, whether the agreement was reached before
'6 Foreign Arbitration Act § 4 (cited in note 130).
,' Arbitration in Sweden at 7.
' Id at 6 n 3.
"' Id at 52. Note, however, that even the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce is not
entirly sure what constitutes "public policy" for these purposes. Id at 52-53.
1 0 Id at 121.
.. Arbitration Act § 13, in Arbitration in Sweden at 175.
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or during the proceedings.' 2 The arbitrator must handle the dis-
pute in an "impartial, practical and speedy manner.' 1 43 In Swedish
domestic arbitration this entails the enforcement of a fairly strin-
gent restraint on the amount of time that an arbitrator has to
make an award.'" While no equivalent time limitation exists for
international arbitration conducted in Sweden 145 and the Optional
Clause and UNCITRAL Rules are silent on the matter, the general
principle of speediness may help ensure that the dispute is han-
dled in a timely manner. In furtherance of this goal, Swedish arbi-
tral tribunals will decide a dispute even if one party refuses to co-
operate with the proceedings. 14  Beyond these requirements,
parties are theoretically free to choose what procedural law will
govern. "So long as the procedures selected do not violate sections
13 and 14 of the Arbitration Act, they will with few exceptions be
permissible."' 47 It is rather difficult, then, given the interaction of
Swedish procedural law, the law of the contract, and UNCITRAL
rules, to state in the abstract exactly what it means for a U.S.-
Soviet JE to use the Optional Clause as its dispute resolution pro-
vision. Two specific problems illustrate the complexities the Op-
tional Clause may present in practice.
1. Service of Process under the Optional Clause.
Parties must begin arbitration proceedings by filing a request
for arbitration directed to the other party in the dispute. 148 Deter-
mining what constitutes permissible service and actual notice is
very complex. UNCITRAL Article 2(1) allows service by leaving
the document(s) at the party's habitual place of residence.4 9 This
rule may conflict with a mandatory provision of Swedish law, de-
pending on which Swedish law applies to service in arbitration pro-
ceedings, a point that is not entirely settled. More specifically, the
Swedish Documents Act may or may. not apply.150 If it does apply,
a party in a civil action may not make effective service on an indi-
vidual by leaving the documents with an agent, family member or
142 Arbitration in Sweden at 95.
', Arbitration Act § 13.
Arbitration Act § 18.
'° Arbitration in Sweden at 121.
"4 Arbitration Act § 14.
14' Arbitration in Sweden at 95-96.
"' Arbitration Act § 11; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 3.1 (cited in note 131).
141 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 2(1).
"o Arbitration in Sweden at 63. The Service of Documents Act of 1970 is discussed in
id at 59-66.
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landlord unlessthere is reason to believe that the party is hiding to
avoid being served. 1' 1 Also, in the Swedish system, the court itself,
rather than the parties, normally takes responsibility for effecting
service. 52
2. Interim Security Measures.
The ability of arbitrators to impose "interim security mea-
sures"-that is, attachments and injunctions-may also create con-
flicts between Swedish and UNCITRAL provisions. Article 26 of
the UNCITRAL Rules gives arbitrators the authority to take in-
terim security measures.1 53 However, this authority may have only
limited effectiveness for two reasons. First, under Swedish law ar-
bitrators are not empowered to enforce such interim security mea-
sures with threats of sanctions.14 Second, a Swedish arbitrator
might refuse to issue such an interim security order on the grounds
that to do so would violate the other party's right to have "suffi-
cient opportunity to present his case," as provided for by section
14 of the Arbitration Act.'5 5 Interaction of the various procedural
codes creates significant uncertainty, which may be particularly
troublesome to a business concerned about potentially serious in-
junctions during the course of dispute resolution.
C. Selection of Arbitrators
As mentioned above, the controlling provision for the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce allows parties to submit any civil dis-
pute to one or more arbitrators for resolution.' 6 Within this
framework, the Swedish rules have a good deal of flexibility con-
cerning the selection and structure of arbitral tribunals, thereby
allowing parties to create a tribunal responsive to their particular
needs.'57
The arbitration panel is created through a process similar to
the one used by the Soviet AC, the key difference being that the
panel can include arbitrators of any nationality. The Optional
Clause requires a three-member arbitration panel, with each mem-
ber selected from a pre-existing list created by the AAA and the
'5, The Book of Civil Procedure (raittengngsbalken) 33:6(2) ("RB"), Arbitration in
Sweden at 2-3; 63-64.
,52 RB § 33:4; Documents Act § 2, cited in Arbitration in Sweden at 65.
"' UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 26 (cited in note 131).
Arbitration Act § 15 (cited in note 124).
,' Arbitration in Sweden at 100.
,6" Arbitration Act § 1.
"I Arbitration in Sweden at 71.
[1990:
USSR JOINT ENTERPRISES
USSR CCI. In other words, arbitration before the ICC allows for
the use of arbitrators who are not Soviet citizens. Therefore, a U.S.
investor concerned about the possibility of Soviet arbitrators being
biased may find the Swedish Option preferable to arbitration
before the AC in the Soviet Union. The list of possible arbitrators
for SCC proceedings contains approximately eighteen notable
practitioners and scholars, approximately two-thirds from Western
Europe, and the rest from Central Europe."'8 There are no Soviet
or U.S. citizens on the list. Each party may select one arbitrator.
The two arbitrators thus chosen then have thirty days to select the
third member, who will serve as the chairman of the panel. 5 ' Fail-
ure by any of those involved to make their selections in a timely
manner will result in a default of the privilege and the SCC will
make the selection in their stead."'
D. Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards
Regardless of the parties' intentions, an arbitration agreement
will not be enforced in Sweden unless it meets the following four
requirements: (1) the parties must have the necessary legal author-
ity to conclude the agreement; (2) the contract must not be tainted
by any matter that would render it void under private law, such as
fraud or duress, and enforcement must not be unreasonable in the
given circumstances; (3) the agreement must identify the matters
to be handled by arbitration; and (4) in accordance with the New
York Convention, the matter must be "capable of settlement by
arbitration" under Swedish law. 61 If a contract does not meet
these requirements, a Swedish arbitration panel will not enforce it.
The enforceability of Swedish awards abroad depends entirely
on the cooperation of the country in which the award must be en-
forced.1 62 However, several safeguards may facilitate enforcement.
First, since the awards are rendered in Sweden, most nations will
treat them as Swedish awards to be tested on the basis of Swedish
law. Second, as long as it has jurisdiction, a Swedish court may, on
request, issue a declaratory judgment confirming the validity of the
l68 Enclosure 2 of the December 12, 1976 letter from the AAA to the USSR CCI, part of
the 1977 Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration in Sweden at 207. The Enclosure is a compre-
hensive list of the individuals who may serve as presiding arbitrators for disputes to be
resolved under the Optional Clause.
'19 Optional Clause 6 (cited in note 114).
"0 Optional Clause 5-6.
161 Arbitration in Sweden at 29-30.
Id at 158.
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award,163 thus facilitating efforts to prove to the enforcing nation
that the award is valid. Third, Sweden is a party to the New York
Convention. 6 " Therefore, neither the U.S. nor the USSR, both of
which are also signatories to the Convention, can block
enforcement.'65
Arbitration fees and expenses are set according to a schedule
provided by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
E. Assessment of the Swedish Arbitration Option
In short, businesses using the Optional Clause cannot assume
that UNCITRAL rules will be the only body of law governing the
procedural aspects of arbitration under the Optional Clause. A
business considering using the Optional Clause would be well-ad-
vised to compare the UNCITRAL and Swedish codes to ensure
that there are no potential conflicts that would result in the appli-
cation of undesirable Swedish procedural rules. Even this precau-
tion, however, may be inadequate; given the difficulty the Swedish
legal community has in determining which provisions of Swedish
law are mandatory and which can be waived, it is possible that an
arbitration panel would reach conclusions differing from those of a
pre-contract investigation by the parties.
Using the Optional Clause may be much more complex than it
appears on the surface; therefore, other options should be consid-
ered as well. Although it may be easy and convenient for parties to
include the Optional Clause in their JE agreements, using the
clause to govern actual disputes may prove rather difficult. The in-
volvement of many legal codes may add substantially to the uncer-
tainty of the proceedings and the time it takes to conduct them. If
time and expense are major concerns for the U.S. investor, this
problem may detract considerably from the appeal of arbitration
before the SCC as contemplated by the Optional Clause.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") in Paris has
settled international commercial disputes since 1923.166 In addition
to the Court of Arbitration, which provides traditional arbitration
,e Id at 159.
164 New York Convention (cited in note 89).
,e' Arbitration in Sweden at 158.
," International Chamber of Commerce Guide to Arbitration 3 (ICC, 1983) ("Guide to
Arbitration").
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services, the ICC offers several less-formal services that attempt to
prevent disputes or resolve them before they require formal
arbitration.
A. Dispute Prevention Services
The ICC offers two "dispute prevention" services: exPertise
proceedings and contract adaptation.1 17 Although the expertise and
contract adaptation processes cannot replace arbitration entirely,
parties to a JE agreement may wish to supplement dispute resolu-
tion with one of these services. An agreement to use one or both of
these services could provide a flexible complement to Soviet-style
arbitration, which is formal and tends to enforce contract provi-
sions strictly. Since the contract itself assumes great importance
during arbitration, these services .might be useful to ensure that
the contract reflects to the greatest extent possible the actual in-
tentions of the parties.
1. Expertise Proceedings.
In expertise proceedings, parties bring their problem to the
Secretariat of the International Centre for Technical Expertise and
request assistance in solving it. Commonly, these proceedings are
sought before the problem has crippled the working relationship
between the parties. Such a problem may arise from an ambiguity,
a gap in the contract, or a change in circumstances.
Expertise proceedings are governed by the International
Center for Technical Expertise. The procedure is available when-
ever the parties agree to submit to it. Regardless of the method of
agreement, 68 parties must initiate each request with an applica-
tion that sets out the details of the problem and the expertise nec-
essary for its resolution.' 69
An expert in the field is selected either by agreement of the
parties or, failing that, by the ICC.'70 Parties may ask the Center
to make use of its "worldwide business and technical connections"
in obtaining an expert.1 7 ' The expert evaluates the situation for
the purpose of identifying the problem and collecting the necessary
,6 Guide to Arbitration at 17-22.
, Id at 18. The ICC prefers that parties express that agreement in a provision in their
contract.
'e' Id.
170 ICC Rules for Technical Expertise, art 4,'reprinted in Guide to Arbitration at 58-59
("Rules for Expertise").
1,, Guide to Arbitration at 18.
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evidence. In addition, if the parties expressly consent, the expert
may make recommendations for changes and supervise the carry-
ing out of contractual obligations. 17 2 Parties may agree in advance
to bind themselves to the recommendations made by the expert.17 3
The ICC Secretariat determines costs, including an adminis-
trative fee and deposit, which the party requesting the expertise
must pay in advance. 74
Expertise may prevent small problems from developing into
full scale disputes. In addition, its informality may foster creative
and prompt resolution. On the other hand, this informality, and
most notably the experts' lack of power to modify the terms of the
governing contract directly, may detract from the usefulness of ex-
pertise proceedings should a future problem arise on the same
issue.
2. Adaptation of Contracts.
Parties may also take advantage of the ICC service for the ad-
aptation of contracts. This service allows parties to turn, upon
agreement, to an independent third person whose purpose is to
adapt their original contract or to fill in gaps in its provisions so
that the contract responds to the current needs of the parties. 1 5
The system was specifically created to facilitate the maintenance
of complex, ongoing contractual relationships such as joint
ventures. 17
To use the service, the parties must first provide the ICC
Standing Committee for the Regulation of Contractual Relations
with evidence of their mutual agreement to the process. This may
be accomplished by a provision in their contract that sets out
under what circumstances they will have recourse to contract
adaptation. 177
Once parties have made an adequate request to the Secretariat
of the Standing Committee, the Standing Committee appoints a
one- or three-person panel, depending on the preference of the
parties.'78 The investigating panel reviews the situation presented
and, in accordance with the expressed desires of the parties, either
171 Rules for Expertise, art 6(1).
'" Rules for Expertise, art 6(3).
' Rules for Expertise, art 7.
175 Guide to Arbitration at 20.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 ICC Rules for Adaptation of Contracts, art 1-3, reprinted in Guide to Arbitration at
61-62 ("Rules for Adaptation").
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makes recommendations or takes a decision.'79 If the panel makes
a recommendation, the parties must consider it in good faith.'8
However, if the panel takes a decision, the parties are bound to the
same extent that they are bound by the contract into which the
panel's decision is to be incorporated. 8'
The Standing Committee determines costs for the service and
limits them to the panel's fees and the administrative costs gener-
ated by the actual services rendered.18 2 The requesting party pays
an advance at the outset ' to cover the fees and expenses of the
panel, plus an administrative charge of US$300.'83 At the end of
the proceedings, when the final costs have been calculated, the par-
ties split the costs evenly, unless the panel has found that the con-
ditions necessary for its involvement in the contract adaptation
process were not met, in which case the requesting party bears the
full costs. 84
The contract adaptation process allows parties to resolve diffi-
culties without disrupting their contractual relationship to the ex-
tent often caused by more formal dispute resolution mechanisms.
Contract adaptation is often faster and less expensive than full ar-
bitration. In general, the panel must make a recommendation or
take a decision within ninety days of receiving the file on the mat-
ter. However, the Standing Committee reserves the right to extend
or reduce the period as it deems necessary. 8 '
B. Dispute Resolution Services
If a dispute progresses beyond the stage at which it can be
averted by one of the dispute prevention options, the parties may
make use of one or both of the ICC's dispute resolution mecha-
nisms: conciliation and formal arbitration. Conciliation provides an
informal alternative to arbitration and therefore may be desirable
for business partners who wish to maintain an amicable relation-
ship in the future. Formal arbitration before the ICC Court of Ar-
bitration may serve as either an alternative or a follow-up to con-
ciliation proceedings.
" Rules for Adaptation, art 11(1).
180 Rules for Adaptation, art 11(2).
"' Rules for Adaptation, art 11(3).
's' Rules for Adaptation, art 13(1).
's' Guide to Arbitration at 21.
"8 Rules for Adaptation, art 13(2).
's' Rules for Adaptation, art 12.
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1. Conciliation.
Conciliation is perhaps best described as an amicable alterna-
tive to formal arbitration. Even' if the parties have included a con-
ciliation provision in their original agreement, the Administrative
Commission for Conciliation will not accept the case unless the
parties specifically reassert their desire to use conciliation for that
dispute.8
The ICC Administrative Commission for Conciliation has the
responsibility for overseeing the process-including receiving re-
quests for conciliation and selecting a three-person committee of
"leading members of the business world" for each dispute.'87 Once
selected, the committee takes primary responsibility for the re-
mainder of the conciliation process; thus, the parties present their
arguments and supporting documentation directly to the concilia-
tion committee appointed for its dispute.'88
To the extent possible, the members of each committee reflect
the nationalities involved-one member from each of the countries
of the two parties and one from a third country who serves as the
chairman.' Unlike the AC or the Swedish Option, the ICC leaves
open the possibility of including a U.S. citizen on the arbitration
panel.
The proceedings involve written and oral review. The panel
first reviews the written cases provided by the parties. It then con-
ducts an oral hearing at which the parties may attend either in
person or through any accredited agent or representative.' 90 In ad-
dition to using the information given to it by the parties, the con-
ciliation committee may also solicit any additional *information it
needs from the parties or their National Committees."'
The process may resolve the dispute or it may serve as a pre-
lude to formal arbitration, usually before the ICC. The committee
may conclude a formal settlement, signed by the, parties. 19 Alter-
natively, the panel may make recommendations that the parties
ISO Guide to Arbitration at 24.
187 Id.
188 ICC Rules for Conciliation, art 2, reprinted in Guide to Arbitration at 67 ("Rules for
Conciliation").
8 Rules for Conciliation, art 1.
1*o Rules for Conciliation, art 3(3). The ICC imposes no restrictions on who the parties
use as their representatives and advisors for oral hearings. Guide to Arbitration at 25.
"18 Rules for Conciliation, art 3. At least 58 countries currently maintain National Com-
mittees that act as liaisons to the ICC. As of 1983, the U.S. had a National Committee, but
the Soviet Union did not. For a more detailed explanation and a list of National Commit-
tees, see Guide to Arbitration at 125-33.
" Rules for Conciliation, art 4.
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are "invited" to use as the basis for resolving their dispute within a
given period. 193 If the conciliation process fails to produce a settle-
ment, the parties are free to pursue formal arbitration or bring an
action at law.
In the event that further action is pursued, several measures
.protect the rights of the parties. Nothing that "arose in connection
with the conciliation" proceedings may affect either party's legal
rights.194 In addition, the individuals who sat on the conciliation
committee may not serve as arbitrators for the same dispute.'95
Costs for the conciliation service include an advance payment
of US$500 for administrative expenses and a final charge calcu-
lated on the basis of the amount in dispute.19 6 Each party pays half
of the costs. It should be noted that the costs of conciliation are
apparently much lower than the costs of arbitration.'9 7 For exam-
ple, conciliators, unlike arbitrators, do not receive any remunera-
tion for their work.' In addition, conciliation may be faster be-
cause it is not subject to the procedural rules that govern ICC
Arbitration Court proceedings.
2. Formal Arbitration.
The ICC Court of Arbitration (the "Court") has a well-
established reputation for competent arbitration of international
commercial disputes in a wide range of areas. As of 1983, the Court
was receiving approximately 250 requests for arbitration per
year.'99 These disputes covered a variety of issues from industrial
'" Guide to Arbitration at 25.
194 Rules for Conciliation, art 5(2).
199 Id.
19. Guide to Arbitration at 26. The schedule for calculating expenses is the same as the
administrative expenses schedule for ICC arbitration proceedings:
Sum in dispute (in $US)
Under 50,000 4.00% (min $1,000)
From 50,001 to 100,000 3.00%
From 100,000 to 500,000 1.50%
From 500,001 to 1,000,000 1.00%
From 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 0.50%
From 2,000,001 to 5,000,000 0.20%
From 5,000,001 to 10,000,000 0.10%
From 10,000,001 to 50,000,000 0.05%
From 50,000,001 to 100,000,000 0.02%
Over 100,000,001 . 0.01%
Id at 91. One half of any charges paid in conjunction with unsuccessful conciliation may be
deducted from the costs of subsequent ICC arbitration. Id at 26.
192 Id at 26.
199 Id at 26, 45.
199 Id at 49.
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cooperation to public works. Foreign trade disputes accounted for
37 percent of all the disputes.2 " The Court works with parties
from diverse geographical backgrounds, with Eastern Europeans
accounting for ten percent of the parties.2 1
The Court limits itself to business disputes submitted to the
ICC on the basis of mutual agreement by the parties. The Court
may accept jurisdiction over international business disputes and, if
there is an arbitration agreement, it may also accept jurisdiction
over disputes that are not of an "international business nature."2 2
As a result, there should be no immediately obvious jurisdictional
problem with submitting a contract dispute between U.S. and So-
viet JE partners to the Court, so long as the partners have in-
cluded an arbitration clause to that effect in their original
agreement.
The work of the Court is confidential and all participants are
expected to respect this condition.20 ' On the other hand, the sys-
tem claims to be open in that -it allows for interaction between the
Court, the arbitrators and the parties.0 4 This is notably different
from other arbitral systems that do not allow informal contact be-
tween the parties and the arbitrators.
The Court itself does not decide any of the disputes submitted
to it. Instead, it selects an ad hoc panel of one or three arbitrators
who review the case and make an award.20 5 Once the proceedings
have begun, the Court's only role is to review the panel's award
before it is issued to the parties.20
In submitting to ICC arbitration, parties are deemed to have
agreed to abide by the Court's rules.20 7 The proceedings need not
take place in Paris; however, they must respect the sovereignty of
the host nation. Therefore, while parties are free to select the body
of procedural law to be applied, they must observe the mandatory
rules of law concerning international arbitration of the nation in
200 Guide to Arbitration at 49.
201 Id.
202 Internal Rules for the Court of Arbitration, Appendix II to the Rules of the ICC
Court of Arbitration, art 1, reprinted in Guide to Arbitration at 83.
20 Internal Rules for the Court of Arbitration, art 2.
204 Guide to Arbitration at 27.
200 Rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration, art 2(1), reprinted in Guide to Arbitration
at 71 ("Rules for the Court").
200 Rules for the Court, art 21.
207 Rules for the Court, art 8(1).
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which the arbitration is conducted.2 " In addition, any rules se-
lected by the parties must be compatible with the ICC Rules.209
Rules designated by the parties or the arbitrator may be used to
fill in gaps left by the ICC Rules.2 1 Finally, the parties may choose
the substantive law to be applied,2 ' but in all cases the arbitrator
must take into account the terms of the contract and relevant
trade practices. 2
As in conciliation, the ICC arbitration procedure involves a re-
view of the written record by the panel followed by an optional
hearing at which the parties may present their cases.21 3 If the par-
ties so agree in advance, the arbitrator may assume the more infor-
mal role of an amiable compositeur,214 thus decreasing the rigidity
of the proceedings and making them more similar to a negotiation
session than to a formal judicial proceeding.2"
On the technical side, the arbitrator determines the language
(or languages) of the arbitration. This determination must be made
in light of all relevant circumstances, most notably the language of
the contract in question. 216 Since most U.S.-USSR JE agreements
are concluded in English and Russian, it seems likely that a U.S.
partner may assume English would be one, if not the only, lan-
guage of the arbitration proceedings.1 7
As mentioned' earlier, the arbitrator must submit the award to
the Court for review. The Court may "lay down modifications as to
the form of the award, and, without affecting the arbitrator's lib-
erty of decision, may also draw his attention to points of sub-
stance."21 8 However, once made, the award is final.21 9
208 Guide to Arbitration at 39. Note the sinmilarity to UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
art 1(2) (cited in note 131), that binds parties to the mandatory provisions of law governing
the arbitration.
209 Rules for the Court, art 11.
210 Rules for the Court, art 11.
21' Rules for the Court, art 13(3).
2 2 Rules for the Court, art 13(5).
2I Rules for the Court, art 14(1).
2," An arbitrator acting as an amiable compositeur operates more as a liaison or negoti-
ator than as an impartial decision maker.
2,5 Rules for the Court, art 13(4).
2,6 Rules for the Court, art 15(3).
17 It is less likely that Russian would be used. The ICC prefers to conduct its proceed-
ings in a single language.
2,8 Rules for the Court, art 21.
, Rules for the Court, art 24(1).
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While the Court may grant extensions in "exceptional circum-
stances," the arbitrator generally has six months from the day on
which the Terms of Reference are signed to make his award.22 °
Under the ICC Rules, the parties, by submitting to ICC arbi-
tration, are deemed to have agreed to execute the award made
without delay and without attempts to appeal.221 While this is the
only enforcement mechanism provided by the ICC rules, U.S. and
Soviet parties can also rely on the New York Convention as
grounds for demanding enforcement.222
Parties to ICC arbitration must cover both advance payment
charges and the final costs as assessed by the Court after the award
has been made. The minimum down-payment of US$500 per party
to cover anticipated administrative expenses must be included
with the initial application to the ICC. The amount paid will then
be deducted from the total amount charged at the end of the pro-
ceedings.223 The Court may also assess separate deposits for any
counterclaims that are submitted apart from the principal claim.224
Depending on the amount assessed for each claim, this provision
may cause parties to limit the number and complexity of the
claims they bring before the Court. The final award must set the
final costs and decide in what proportions the parties will bear
those costs.22 The fee schedules for administrative expenses and
arbitrators set out the rates to be charged as a percentage of the
amount in dispute.22 6 Unlike the conciliation process, the parties to
an arbitration must-pay the individuals who review their dispute,
which significantly increases the cost of the process.
E. Assessment of the ICC Dispute Resolution Option
Although the expertise and contract adaptation processes of
the ICC cannot replace arbitration, parties to a JE agreement may
wish to consider adding as a supplement to their dispute resolution
clause a provision in which they agree to submit to one or both of
220 Rules for the Court, art 18(1-2). The "Terms of Reference" is a document drawn by
the arbitrator that lays out the claims and counterclaims of the parties and defines the
general parameters of the subsequent arbitration. Its form and content are governed by
Article 13 of the Rules of the Court.
221 Rules for the Court, art 24(2).
222 New York Convention (cited in note 89).
223 Schedule of Conciliation and Arbitration Costs, Appendix III to the Rules of the
ICC Court, art 3, reprinted in Guide to Arbitration at 90 (cited in note 166).
2.4 Rules for the Court, art 9(1).
.2 Rules for the Court, art 29(1).
22 Schedule of Conciliation and Arbitration Costs, § 5(a).
[1990:
USSR JOINT ENTERPRISES
these options in specified situations. Such a provision may
strengthen the good faith commitment of the parties to the non-
adversarial settlement of disputes, and it might prove invaluable in
resolving disputes before they become grave enough to undermine
the JE agreement.
Even if attempts at conciliation fail in a given case, the exer-
cise of having gone through the process may be useful. It may help
parties identify their true points of' contention, thus simplifying
proceedings before the ICC Court. In turn, simplified arbitration
proceedings may save the parties time and money.
CONCLUSION
U.S. businesses negotiating JE agreements with Soviet part-
ners would be well-advised to give serious consideration to the full
range of dispute resolution options available before choosing a par-
ticular dispute resolution mechanism. While the Optional Clause
drafted by the AAA and the USSR CCI in 1977 has been popular
and provides a ready-made provision that has the backing of the
Soviet authorities, it is far from clear whether the provision will be
as easy to use as it is to install in the contract. The uncertainty
created by the need to coordinate Swedish law, UNCITRAL rules
and the law created by the terms of the contract itself may out-
weigh the ease it creates in the negotiation process. If U.S. inves-
tors are adamant about not submitting to dispute resolution before
the AC, they should consider neutral location alternatives, such as
the ICC in Paris or the Swedish Option, although the latter may
not always meet the needs of a particular JE relationship.
Whatever dispute resolution mechanism is finally included in the
contract, the U.S. and Soviet partners should be certain that they
feel relatively comfortable with it, since it could become the key
for overcoming difficulties throughout the life of the partnership.
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